The Principle of Procedural Economy and Bureaucratic Barriers in Peru's New Constitutional Procedural Code: Perceptions of Legal Practitioners at the Second Constitutional Court of Lima

Abstract

Law 31307, which enacted Peru's New Constitutional Procedural Code, prohibited the preliminary dismissal of rights-protection claims and requires judges to admit even manifestly inadmissible claims. This study aimed to determine legal practitioners' perceptions of how this rule affects the principle of procedural economy and the length of constitutional proceedings. A quantitative approach with a non-experimental, cross-sectional and descriptive design was used. The participants were 80 legal practitioners from the Second Constitutional Court of Lima (69 attorneys and 11 judges), who answered a Likert-type questionnaire validated through expert judgment. Overall, 61.3% considered that admitting every constitutional claim undermines procedural economy; 58.8% stated that indiscriminate admission compromises effective procedural protection; and 55.0% associated the prohibition of preliminary dismissal with greater legal uncertainty. In addition, 56.3% disagreed that the new code favors procedural speed. It is concluded that, for most practitioners, the rule introduces procedural steps that add nothing to the final decision; therefore, preliminary screening mechanisms that preserve access to constitutional justice should be evaluated.